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  Abstract 
In 2013, changes to the regulations regarding school absences meant that head teachers 
could no longer authorise term-time holidays. As a consequence of this parents who wish to 
take their children on holiday during term-time are now liable for a fixed penalty notice. This 
policy has been the subject of a number of legal challenges most notably in a case heard by 
the UK Supreme Court in 2017 which upheld local authorities’ power to impose fines for 
term-time holidays. This article examines the legal and political arguments around the 
extension of penalty notices for term-time holidays. It reviews the various challenges to the 
policy, focusing on the Supreme Court judgment. The article goes on to make an alternative 
case for review of this policy based on the manner in which the regulations were changed, 
arguing that the Secretary of State for Education exceeded his powers by changing 
attendance regulations without parliamentary approval and in a way that parliament had 
not intended when legislation governing the use of penalty notices was passed in 2003.  
 
In 2013, the Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove, changed the regulations governing the 
recording of school absences. Mr Gove removed headteachers’ power to authorise up to ten days 
absence in any school year to allow a child to go on holiday. The effect of this change was to make 
parents who take children out of school for holidays liable to a fixed-penalty notice under legislation 
designed to combat truancy, which had been introduced by the Labour government in 2003. The 
changes in the regulations have led to a significant increase in the number of penalty notices issued 
(Long and Bolton, 2017). The application of penalty notices to term-time holidays has been 
unpopular amongst parents and teachers (YouGov, 2014; YouGov, 2017; Parker, 2017), and has 
prompted a number of legal challenges. Most notably, in 2017 the UK Supreme Court upheld a 
penalty notice issued by Isle of Wight Council to a parent, Jon Platt, who refused to pay a fine after 
taking his daughter out of school for a holiday. The Court ruled that any unauthorised absence, no 
matter how small, and irrespective of the child’s level of attendance prior to the absence, could lead 
to criminal liability.  
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This article examines the legal and political arguments around the imposition of fines for term-time 
holidays. It begins by examining the legal obligation to ensure that children attend school and the 
introduction, in 2003, of penalty notices to combat truancy. It goes on to examine the various 
challenges to the use of penalty notices to penalise parents who have taken their children out of 
school for holidays, focusing in particular on the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Platt case. The 
article concludes by setting out the grounds for a review of the application of fines for term-time 
holidays based on an examination of the manner in which the regulations were changed. The 
purpose here is not to challenge the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Platt case, although it is 
argued that the judgment was in a number of respects anomalous. Rather it is argued that the 
manner in which the regulations were changed, through the use of a Statutory Instrument which 
was not subject to parliamentary scrutiny, leaves scope for a further review of this policy on the 
basis that the Secretary of State exceeded his powers. It is argued that, by changing the regulations 
regarding what can be constituted as an authorised absence, Mr Gove removed headteachers’ 
discretion regarding the authorisation of absences and changed the meaning of the Anti-Social 
Behaviour Act in a way which parliament did not intend when the legislation was passed in 2003.   
The legal basis for penalty notices for school absences 
The legal basis for imposing penalties for school absences lies in the 1996 Education Act which places 
a legal obligation on parents to ensure their child attends school. Section 444 of the Act states that: 
‘If a child of compulsory school age who is a registered pupil at a school fails to attend regularly at 
the school, his parent is guilty of an offence’. There are in fact two offences under section 444. The 
first (s.444 (1)) relates to parents who fail to ensure that their child attends school regularly. If 
convicted of this offence parents can be subject to a fine of up to £1000. A further more serious 
offence (s.444 (1A)) was added in 2001 for circumstances in which a parent fails to deal with 
persistent truancy. Parents who know that their child is not attending school regularly, presumably 
because they have already been informed about this, and subsequently fail to ensure attendance, 
can be subject to a fine of £2500 or up to three months imprisonment. The legislation does provide 
parents with a number of statutory defences against prosecution to allow for absence as the result 
of ‘sickness or any unavoidable cause’ and in the case of knowingly allowing a child not to attend, a 
defence of ‘reasonable justification’ for their failure to ensure attendance may be considered. 
Crucially, however, the Act does not define what constitutes regular attendance. The only attempt 
to quantify regular attendance in the 1996 Act related to the very specific circumstances of a child of 
no fixed abode, for whom a defence against prosecution for non-attendance may be made if the 
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child ‘has made at least 200 attendances during the period of 12 months ending with the date on 
which the proceedings were instituted’ (Education Act 1996, s.444).  
While the Education Act 1996 made an offence of failing to ensure a child’s regular attendance at 
school, the application of fixed-penalty notices for school absences was introduced by the Labour 
government as part of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. This made it easier for local authorities to 
punish parents by allowing for a penalty notice to be issued in respect of failure to ensure regular 
attendance at school. Penalty notices allow individuals to avoid criminal conviction and a potentially 
more significant penalty by agreeing to accept a small fine. Although penalty notices had been 
widely used, primarily to deal with motoring offences, Labour significantly expanded their use to 
deal with a wide-range of other offences including public order offences, environmental crimes and 
truancy. Under the Anti-Social Behaviour Act parents could avoid a section 444 conviction if they 
agreed to pay a fixed penalty of £60 increasing to £120 if not paid within 21 days. Penalty notices 
can be issued by the local authority, a headteacher or the police. The Anti-Social Behaviour Act also 
introduced various other measures designed to support or require parents to deal with 
misbehaviour and irregular attendance including parenting contracts which are signed agreements 
between parents and schools, and parenting orders, which can be imposed on parents by the courts 
(Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, part 3).  
While the Anti-Social Behaviour Act relied on the definition of an offence provided in section 444 of 
the 1996 Education Act it offered no further clarity as to what might constitute regular attendance. 
Moreover, the legislation provided for considerable freedom in the drafting of regulations regarding 
the form and content of the penalty notice, including the amount and the circumstances in which it 
might be applied. The details of the policy including an exemption for term-time holidays, and 
subsequent removal of this exemption, were not set out in the legislation but were introduced in a 
series of regulations introduced over subsequent years. These allowed for considerable discretion in 
the application of the policy. The form of the penalty notices, for example, were set out in a 
regulation introduced in 2007, which allowed local education authorities to draw up codes of 
practice with regard to the consistent application of penalties within a local authority area, but 
allowed for differential practice between local authorities (Education (Penalty Notices) Regulations, 
2007). The exemption for term-time holidays was included in regulations introduced in 2006 which 
stated that pupils could be granted leave of absence to go away on holiday but that ‘except in 
exceptional circumstances’ this would not amount to more than ten days leave of absence in one 
school each year (Education (Pupil Registration Regulations, 2006). This exemption was changed by 
new regulations introduced by Education Secretary, Michael Gove, which came into force on 1 
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September 2013 (Education (Pupil Registration) (Amendment) Regulations, 2013). This tightened up 
the rules regarding when headteachers could authorise an absence, by stating that leave of 
absence would only be granted in ‘exceptional circumstances’ and that this would no longer include 
up to ten days a year for a family holiday. As a result absence for holidays would now be classed as 
an unauthorised absence. This left parents who take their children out of school for holidays open to 
the imposition of a fixed-penalty notice under the Anti-Social Behaviour Act. Failure to pay could 
lead to prosecution under section 444 of the Education Act 1996. 
In the period since 1996 there was a gradual tightening up of the law relating to school attendance 
and an erosion in the power of headteachers to apply discretion in this area. While the 1996 
Education Act imposed a legal obligation on parents to ensure their child attends school, subsequent 
changes have provided for tougher penalties for failing to meet this obligation, as well as making it 
easier for local authorities to punish parents. There are, however, a number of anomalies in relation 
to the law in this area. While the law clearly imposes an expectation that children should regularly 
attend school, neither the 1996 legislation nor any of the subsequent regulations, have sought to 
define what constitutes regular attendance, effectively leaving it up to the courts to arbitrate on 
this. Moreover, while headteachers retain a broad general autonomy to authorise ‘leave’ and a 
particular authority to do so in relation to illness, to allow for religious observance or for any other 
‘unavoidable cause’ (Education Act 1996), since the introduction of the 2013 regulations 
headteachers no longer have discretion to apply the rules in relation to absences for term-time 
holidays. Finally, many of the regulations relating to attendance policies particularly in relation to 
the imposition of penalty notices for non-attendance are not included in primary legislation but have 
been added to existing legislation by the Secretary of State for Education through a process which 
has involved very little, if any, parliamentary scrutiny. As will be argued below these gaps leave 
scope for review of this policy particularly in relation to its application to term-time holidays. 
Challenging penalty notices for term-time absence 
The introduction of penalties for term-time holidays has generated considerable opposition and has, 
perhaps inevitably, been challenged in the courts. The introduction of penalty notices for school 
absences not only made it easier for local authorities to punish parents but also shifted responsibility 
for initiating legal proceedings onto parents wishing to contest the notice. Schools and local 
authorities wishing to punish parents for failing to ensure their child attends school no longer have 
to undertake costly legal proceedings, but this is the only option for parents who wish to challenge a 
penalty notice. Perhaps not surprisingly while there has been a steep increase in number of penalty 
notices issued, particularly since 2013 (Long & Bolton, 2017), most parents have chosen to pay the 
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penalty rather than risk the potentially more costly option of challenging a penalty notice in the 
courts. Consequently while there has been considerable opposition to the policy amongst parents’ 
groups, not least on the grounds that the policy discriminates against less well-off parents, 
challenging the policy in the courts has been limited to those with the resources to do so.  
In 2014 a campaign for judicial review of the policy was organised by a group of parents under the 
banner, Parents Want a Say. The campaign was supported by the Liberal Democrat MP, John 
Hemming, and was based on the argument that penalty notices for term-time holidays represented 
a breach of the right to a family life, which is protected under the Human Rights Act. Parents Want a 
Say also argued that the policy particularly discriminated against less well-off parents who could not 
afford to take family holidays during school holiday periods when prices are at a premium. This 
argument was reinforced by reports that the policy was having little impact on better-off parents 
who had simply begun to factor the £60 penalty into the cost of a holiday. It was also argued that 
the policy had little basis in educational research and was being used by local authorities as a means 
of generating revenue (Griffiths, 2014a).  
The claim that local authorities use penalty charges as a means of revenue generation have been 
made in relation to the application of other fixed-penalty notices such as parking charges. A 2013 
inquiry by the House of Commons transport select committee found that although the setting of 
parking charges in order to raise revenue was illegal, ‘there is a deep-rooted public perception that 
local authorities view parking enforcement as a cash cow’  and that ‘there is a very strong case for 
more transparency about how funds are spent’ (Transport Committee, 2013). The increase in the 
use of penalty notices in relation to term-time absences and in particular the disparities in the 
application of penalty notices across local authority areas has prompted similar concerns. In March 
2018, the BBC reported that penalty notices for unauthorised school absences had generated 
£24million for local authorities in England and Wales. It also revealed considerable disparities 
between local authorities in the application of the policy (Cawley, 2018).  
While Parents Want a Say sought to crowdfund support, the costs involved in mounting a legal 
challenge have meant that the most significant challenges have come from those who have been 
able to pay. In 2014, The Sunday Times reported that ‘a high flying executive’ (a banker from JP 
Morgan), was about to mount a test case, by refusing to pay a penalty notice issued by his local 
authority, Essex County Council, when he took his three children out of school to attend a memorial 
service in the USA for their great-grandfather. This case did not involve a term-time holiday but 
related to the headteacher’s refusal to authorise an absence on the grounds that attending a 
relative’s memorial service was not considered an exceptional circumstance (Griffiths, 2014b). 
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Interestingly, this decision was based on an assessment of the attendance level of the children 
involved and although all three children attended the same primary school the penalty notice was 
only issued in relation to one of the children who had an attendance of 87%. The family, who were 
represented by lawyers provided by Liberty, argued that the prosecution was a breach of their 
human rights, in particular the children’s right to a family life. The case was eventually withdrawn by 
Essex County Council when the family emigrated to the United States. Although the local authority 
maintained that the school had followed their attendance policy to the letter, it was not considered 
in the public interest to pursue a prosecution once the family had left the country (ITV News, 2014).  
The most significant challenge to fines for term-time holidays came from Jon Platt, a businessman 
from the Isle of Wight, who was taken to court by his local authority after taking his daughter on a 
holiday to Disney World in Florida in April 2015, causing her to miss seven days of school. Platt’s 
request to take his daughter out of school was declined by the headteacher of her primary school. 
Following the unauthorised absence, Platt was issued with a £60 penalty notice, which was 
increased to £120 after 28 days. On failing to pay the fine, Platt was prosecuted in the Magistrates 
court. Platt’s defence rested on the question of what constituted regular attendance and focused on 
his daughter’s attendance record to date. It was argued that Platt’s daughter, who had an 
attendance rate of 95% prior to the holiday and 90% afterwards, could not be seen as not attending 
school regularly. His case was supported by the council’s own policies which defined an attendance 
rate of between 90% and 95% as satisfactory. The Magistrates decided there was no case to answer 
and Platt was found not guilty. When the local authority appealed the case to the High Court they 
also found in Platt’s favour, agreeing that the child’s level of attendance prior to the unauthorised 
absence should be taken into consideration.  
With the support of the Department for Education, the Isle of Wight Council appealed again, to the 
UK Supreme Court. The case was heard in January 2017 and the judgement delivered in April. The 
Supreme Court overruled the decisions of the lower courts and found that Mr. Platt had committed 
an offence under section 444 of the 1996 Education Act. The case was returned to the Magistrates 
court where Mr. Platt was given a 12 month conditional discharge and ordered to pay costs 
(Supreme Court, 2017; Coughlan, 2017).  
The Supreme Court judgement once again focused on the meaning of ‘fails to attend regularly’ in 
section 444 of the Education Act 1996. Unlike the lower courts the Supreme Court did not, however, 
seek to quantify regular attendance but sought instead to offer a definition of ‘regularly’ which was 
not dependent upon a calculation of previous attendance. In seeking to determine what Parliament 
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meant when the legislation was passed, the justices argued that there are three possible meanings 
of regularly: 
(a) Evenly spaced, as in “he attends Church regularly every Sunday”; (b) sufficiently often, as 
in “he attends Church regularly, almost every week”; or (c) in accordance with the rules, as 
in “he attends Church when he is required to do so” (Supreme Court, 2017, para.1).  
The first definition it was argued could not apply. If ‘regularly attend’ meant attending at evenly 
spaced intervals ‘it would enable attendance every Monday to count as regular even though 
attendance every day of the week is required.’ The court observed that the second definition of 
‘regularly attend’ as sufficiently frequently ‘might well be the meaning assumed by many people at 
first reading’ and appears to be the definition applied in previous judgments. This definition it 
suggested ‘is what we mean when we talk about a person being a regular at the pub or a regular at 
church services’. But cannot apply to schools because ‘attendance at the pub or at church is not 
compulsory.’ In a somewhat circular argument the judges also argued that this definition would lead 
to a debate over the meaning of ‘sufficient’. Without quantifying what level of attendance is 
considered sufficient: ‘Over what period is the sufficiency of attendance to be judged? How much is 
sufficient?’ Which was, of course, precisely the argument made by Mr. Platt’s defence team in 
relation to the term ‘regular’ (Supreme Court, 2017, para.30-32).   
The Court concluded that the only possible definition of regularly in the case of school attendance, 
must be attendance on every occasion when it is expected. According to this definition regularly 
means ‘in accordance with the rules’ and as a result ‘a single missed attendance without leave or 
unavoidable cause could lead to criminal liability.’ The Court argued that there are ‘many examples 
where a very minor or trivial breach of the law can lead to criminal liability’, such as, for example, 
stealing a milk bottle, driving at 31 miles per hour in a 30 miles per hour zone, or failing to declare 
imported goods over the permitted level (Supreme Court, 2017, para 32-3).  
Although the Court focused on the narrow question of the meaning of regular attendance, in arriving 
at its judgement it did also give consideration to wider arguments regarding the impact of school 
absence. The Court, for example, accepted the Government’s argument ‘that there is a clear 
statistical link between school attendance and educational attainment’ (Supreme Court, 2017, 
para.40), a claim which has been contested in a number of studies (Dağli, 2018; Santry, 2016). It also 
argued that absence was disruptive not just to the individual child’s education but also to other 
children either by undermining the value of group learning or by taking up teachers’ time through 
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the allocation of additional or replacement work. Finally, it concluded that it was, in principle, 
unacceptable for parents to disregard school rules relating to attendance, concluding: 
This is not an approach to rule-keeping which any educational system can be expected to 
find acceptable. It is a slap in the face to those obedient parents who do keep the rules, 
whatever the cost of inconvenience to themselves (Supreme Court, 2017, para.41). 
The decision was, no doubt, a relief for the government. Interestingly, however, the government’s 
response stressed that the courts had asserted the rights of headteachers to decide when absences 
could be authorised, with the Prime Minister for example, observing that, ‘It's right that the 
individual head teacher has that flexibility to make that decision’ (Coughlan, 2017). This is at best a 
misunderstanding of the case, which did not focus on the question of who has the right to authorise 
absences but the circumstances in which authorisation may be allowed. In fact, the 2013 regulations 
had removed headteachers’ flexibility in this area, by preventing them from allowing up to ten days 
absence a year for a family holidays. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision to apply a narrow 
definition of ‘regularly attend’ to mean on every occasion on which it is expected, rather than for 
example, most of the time, also appears to limit headteachers’ discretion in this area.  
Parliamentary intent and the case for review of penalty notices for term-time holidays 
Legal challenges to the policy of imposing penalty notices for school absences have focused on the 
potential for the law to infringe human rights and the extent to which existing levels of attendance 
should be considered when authorizing absence. While the withdrawal of the case involving Essex 
County Council means that the human rights argument was never tested in the courts, the Supreme 
Court judgment in the Platt case does provide a definitive meaning for the parents’ duty to ensure 
regular attendance as set out in the Education Act 1996. The door to further challenges based on a 
child’s level of attendance is now firmly closed.  
There may, however, be scope for a further review of this policy based on consideration of the 
process whereby changes were made to the regulations to allow for the imposition of penalty 
notices for parents who take their children out of school for term-time holidays. This argument is not 
based on interpretation of the meaning of the law, but on whether the way in which the law is 
currently being applied is in keeping with what Parliament intended when penalty notices for school 
absences were introduced in 2003. 
In the UK system, it is the role of the courts to interpret the law as passed by Parliament. The courts 
often refer to the intention of Parliament when reaching their judgments. If legislation is clear, then 
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appeals to parliamentary intent are rarely necessary. However, if the construction of legislation is 
ambiguous or obscure then the courts may look back at parliamentary material in order to 
determine what was intended when the legislation was passed (Ekins, 2012). The role of the courts 
in interpreting the intentions of Parliament when a piece of legislation was passed has generated 
considerable debate. Critics of this approach argue that there is no such thing as legislative intent, 
not least because Parliament does not have one mind. Members of Parliament, sitting in two Houses 
may intend different things when debating and voting on a piece of legislation and any analysis of 
parliamentary material which focuses on the views of individual parliamentarians cannot be used to 
determine the views of parliament as a whole (Craig, 2004; Laws, 2017). Defenders of the 
construction of legislative intent, argue that while individual parliamentarians may have different 
views, legislation arises from a majority vote on a particular policy proposal or plan. If the resulting 
legislation is not clear, the intentions may be discerned through careful examination of the proposals 
as put to Parliament (Ekins, 2012; Allan, 2004). Moreover, while parliamentary intent may at times 
prove elusive, it may at least be possible to determine what Parliament did not intend when passing 
a piece of legislation. 
In arriving at their judgement in the Platt case, the Supreme Court was primarily concerned with 
seeking to establish what Parliament meant by ‘attend regularly’ when the Education Act was passed 
in 1996. In their judgement the Court stated that, in reference to the three possible meanings of 
regularly attend, their aim was to decide, ‘which was the meaning intended by Parliament when 
enacting section 444 (1)’ (Supreme Court, 2017, para.29). Parliament is invoked elsewhere in the 
Supreme Court’s judgment, for example, in the assertion that ‘Parliament is unlikely to have found it 
acceptable that parents could take their children out of school in blatant disregard of school rules’ 
(para.41) and that the provision regarding an acceptable level of attendance for children of no fixed 
abode, ‘illustrates that when Parliament wishes to indicate what, in its view, is sufficiently frequent, 
it can and does do so’ (para. 36).  
However, what is striking in this case is not that the Supreme Court focused on the meaning of 
regular attendance in the Education Act 1996, but that it gave no consideration at all to what 
Parliament intended when penalty notices for school absence were introduced as part of the Anti-
Social Behaviour Act 2003. As noted above, while the 1996 Act imposes a responsibility on parents to 
ensure that their children attend school, it is the 2003 Act which allows local authorities to issue 
penalty notices for failing to meet this obligation and it was as a consequence of failing to pay a fine 
under this piece of legislation that Mr. Platt was prosecuted.  
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This question is complicated by the fact that the extension of penalty notices to cover term-time 
holidays was not included in either the 1996 or the 2003 legislation but was introduced as a 
consequence of a piece of delegated legislation, or Statutory Instrument, which Parliament did not 
have the opportunity to debate. Statutory Instruments are mechanisms which confer powers on 
Ministers or other public bodies in relation to the operation and implementation of particular Acts of 
Parliament. This might include the provision of detailed regulations or setting the level of charges or 
fees which might change over time. Crucially, Statutory Instruments must relate to a particular Act of 
Parliament and must not go beyond what is allowed for in the parent Act (Byrne, 1976; Fox and 
Blackwell, 2014).  
Statutory Instruments come in a number of different forms and are not subject to the same level of 
scrutiny as Acts of Parliament. Affirmative instruments require specific approval by both Houses of 
Parliament before coming into effect. Negative instruments come into effect automatically unless 
either House seeks to annul them. These are, by far, the most numerous category of Statutory 
Instrument. There is a third category which do not require any parliamentary approval at all, but 
these are really for information and comprise a very small proportion of Statutory Instruments in 
each parliamentary session (Byrne, 1976; Rogers and Walters, 2015). Statutory Instruments are 
rarely debated in the chamber but are considered by a Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. 
The committee, however, does not consider every Statutory Instrument in detail, has no formal 
powers to reject an instrument and it is possible for instruments to be passed before the committee 
has considered them (Norton, 2013).  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the opportunity to avoid detailed parliamentary scrutiny means that the 
use of Statutory Instruments has become increasingly popular with governments. The number of 
Statutory Instruments in each parliamentary session has more than doubled in the last thirty years, 
with well over 3,000 Statutory Instruments now made in each calendar year (Rogers & Walters, 
2015;  House of Lords Constitution Committee, 2016). Critics have pointed to the ‘explosion’ in use 
of Statutory Instruments as evidence of a decline in the extent and quality of legislative scrutiny 
(Korris, 2011; Fox and Korris, 2010). It is not just the number, but also the length of Statutory 
Instruments that has increased, so that the number of pages of delegated legislation passed in a 
parliamentary session now significantly exceeds the number of pages of primary legislation. This has 
led to the suspicion that governments are seeking to present primary legislation in skeleton form so 
that the details can be added at a later date through the less arduous tabling of delegated 
legislation. In a report for the Hansard Society in 2010, Fox and Korris observed that there were 
often ‘significant disparities between the content of the discussion at the primary legislation stage 
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and the final content of delegated legislation’ and as a result there is often ‘a chasm between what 
MPs and Peers are led to believe they are voting for and what is actually delivered’ (Fox and Korris, 
2010). Similarly in 2016, a House of Lords Constitution Committee inquiry into the use of delegated 
legislation observed that: 
Delegated powers in primary legislation have increasingly been drafted in broad and poorly-
defined language that has permitted successive governments to use delegated legislation to 
address issues of policy and principle, rather than points of an administrative or technical 
nature (House of Lords Constitution Committee, 2016).  
While the use of Statutory Instruments has become increasingly popular with governments, making 
changes to legislation through delegated or secondary legislation has provided a rich source for 
claims for judicial review on the basis that Ministers have exceeded their powers. This may be a 
particular problem if Statutory Instruments are introduced a long time after the parent Act, or if, for 
example, a Statutory Instrument seeks to make changes to a piece of legislation introduced by a 
previous government. If Statutory Instruments are used to make changes which go beyond what 
Parliament intended in the passage of a piece of legislation, Ministers leave themselves open to the 
charge that they are acting ultra vires, beyond their powers. Moreover, unlike primary legislation, 
Statutory Instruments can be subject to judicial review and, if it is decided that Ministers have 
exceeded their powers, can be overturned by the courts. 
The principle that parents should ensure their children attend school regularly is established in 
primary legislation, the Education Act 1996; as is the power to apply penalty notices for failure to 
meet this obligation, the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. However, as noted above, much of the 
detail regarding the application of these policies is set out in a series of Statutory Instruments which 
were not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Most significantly, the regulations governing the 
authorization of absences, which underpins the 1996 parental obligation to ensure regular 
attendance, is almost entirely contained in secondary legislation (Education (Pupil Registration) 
Regulations, 2006). In some cases these Statutory Instruments are much more detailed than the 
legislation to which they relate. For example, the principle that penalty notices can be used to 
combat truancy is set out in skeleton form in a little over three pages of the Anti-Social Behaviour 
Act 2003, while the Statutory Instrument which puts flesh on these legislative bones runs to eight 
detailed pages (Education (Penalty Notices) Regulations, 2007). These regulations not only set out 
technical details such as the level of fines for penalty notices, but also such issues as who is 
authorised to impose and collect fines and the power of the Secretary of State to demand changes 
to local authority codes of conduct in relation to the issue of penalty notices.  
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The application of penalty notices for term-time holidays came about as a result of a very short 
Statutory Instrument in 2013  (Education (Pupil Registration) (Amendment) Regulations 2013) which 
removed headteachers’ discretion to allow for absence of up to ‘ten school days for the purpose of a 
holiday.’ This was a negative Statutory Instrument which Parliament did not seek to annul and was 
not therefore subject to parliamentary scrutiny or debate (Joint Committee on Statutory 
Instruments, 2013). Although this change related to the regulations governing pupil attendance 
included in a previous Statutory Instrument (Education (Pupil Registration) Regulations 2006), it also 
had the effect of changing the meaning of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, by expanding the 
boundaries of what constitutes an unauthorised absence. If there are grounds for challenging the 
Education Secretary’s decision to change the regulations governing unauthorised absences, it will 
need to be shown that the effect of this change was not what Parliament intended when voting to 
support the expansion of penalty notices to cover school absences in 2003.  
Although the Education Secretary’s changes to the regulations regarding attendance were not 
subject to parliamentary scrutiny in 2013, the issue of penalty notices for unauthorised absence was 
debated at length when the Anti-Social Behaviour Bill made its way through Parliament in 2003. 
There was considerable opposition, particularly from the Conservative benches, to the use of 
penalty notices for any form of school absence. Several MPs raised questions about the desirability 
and practicalities of making teachers responsible for imposing and collecting fines from parents. The 
Conservative shadow education spokesperson, Oliver Letwin, was particularly critical of ‘the mind-
numbing idea that teachers could hand out fixed penalty notices to the parents of children at their 
school’ concluding that, ‘I cannot imagine how the Home Secretary imagines that such a provision 
would be workable’ (Hansard – Commons, 8 April 2003 col.152).  The Conservative MP, John Bercow, 
now Speaker of the House of Commons, was critical of the ‘breast-beating Home Secretary’ who 
appeared to be legislating ‘simply to feel better or to appeal to the Daily Mail or other tabloid 
newspapers’ (Hansard – Commons, 8 April, 2003, col.195). Another Conservative MP, and former 
teacher, Liz Blackman, expressed ‘grave concerns’ about the notion that teachers would be 
responsible for imposing fines on parents (Hansard – Commons, 8 April 2003, cols.177-179), a view 
which was echoed by several members who felt it would damage the relationship between schools 
and parents. These included the Liberal Democrat MP, Annette Brooke, who observed that, ‘it is 
incredibly undesirable for head teachers and teachers to impose fines for truancy: a separation is 
needed between enforcers and those who are trying to work with children and their families’ 
(Hansard – Commons, 8 April 2003, col.185). 
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On the more specific issue of whether penalty notices might be applied to parents taking their 
children on holiday during term-time there is no evidence that this was the government’s intention 
and the issue was simply not discussed when the Anti-Social Behaviour Bill made its way through 
Parliament. The clear intention as outlined during the passage of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act, was 
that fixed-penalty notices were designed to deal with persistent and problematic truancy, and at no 
point was it suggested that they should be used for anything other than this. In introducing the Bill, 
the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, made it clear that part 3 of the Bill which dealt with penalty 
notices and parenting orders, ‘relates to truancy’ and referred, in particular, to the need to tackle 
‘the few parents whose behaviour is not only a terrible example to their children and others, but a 
disruption to the life and work of schools’ (Hansard – Commons, 8 April 2003, col.144). The debate in 
the House of Commons centred on the notion that children who were playing truant were not under 
the supervision of anyone else and as a result truancy was seen a route into bad behaviour. The 
Labour MP, Ann Coffey, argued that the package of measures in the Bill were designed to help 
children from ‘chaotic families’, in order to ‘keep those children from failing at school, turning to 
criminality and costing the state thousands in secure accommodation, youth custody and years in 
and out of jail’ (Hansard – Commons, 8 April 2003, col.188). While the Home Office Minister, Bob 
Ainsworth responded to criticisms of the proposal by asking: ‘What is the matter, in some 
circumstances, with head teachers and governing bodies approving specific members of staff to 
issue fixed penalty notices to deal with the problem of truancy?’ (Hansard - Commons, 8 April 2003, 
col. ) The emphasis on penalty notices as a tool to deal with truancy was mirrored in the House of 
Lords, where the government spokesperson, Baroness Scotland, specifically and repeatedly referred 
to the policy as ‘penalty notices for truancy.’ (Hansard – Lords, 18 July 2003 col.1153; Hansard – 
Lords, 17 September 2003 col.970-971).  
Moreover, in response to concerns raised in both chambers about who would be responsible for 
issuing penalty notices, considerable emphasis was placed on the discretion which would be 
exercised by headteachers and others in the application of this policy. The government made clear 
that decisions about the application of the policy would be taken at a local level. The clear 
implication was not that the penalty notice would be applied in every case but that headteachers 
and education welfare officers would employ their judgement as to the seriousness of the case. The 
government’s position was set out clearly by Baroness Scotland in the House of Lords: 
We expect most fixed penalty notices for truancy to be issued by local authority education 
welfare officers, who also organise prosecutions for truancy. We believe that it is right to 
give head teachers and assistant head teachers, authorised by them, the power to do so. 
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The decision whether to issue a penalty notice in an individual case will involve the making 
of a professional judgment, which we believe can be appropriately exercised by the senior 
management (Hansard – Lords, 18 July 2003 col.1153). 
While there was considerable debate about the merits of allowing schools to issue penalty notices, 
with regard to the purpose of penalty notices for school absences, the intention of Parliament is 
clear. Penalty notices for school absences were included in the Anti-Social Behaviour Bill as a means 
of combating truancy. This was the clearly stated position of the government when presenting the 
Bill to Parliament, and this is what MPs and Peers voted for. It was the only purpose for the 
introduction of penalty notices for school absences. At no point during the passage of the Anti-Social 
Behaviour Act did any member on the government or opposition benches anticipate or suggest that 
penalty notices could or should be used to prevent parents taking their children out of school in 
order to go on holiday. Moreover, while penalty notices were clearly designed to deal with 
unauthorised absences, the legislation was also based on the notion that headteachers and other 
authorised individuals, would be able to use their professional judgement to determine when 
absences could be authorised and penalty notices applied. While headteachers retain the power to 
decide whether to issue a penalty notice, the change to the regulations introduced by the Education 
Secretary in 2013, removed the possibility for headteachers to use their professional judgement in 
decisions about authorising absence for term-time holidays and as a result changed the meaning of 
the Anti-Social Behaviour Act, by creating a criminal liability for all parents taking their children out 
of school to go on holiday. These changes, which were included in a piece of secondary legislation, 
and not therefore subject to detailed scrutiny or debate, appear to go some way beyond the 
technical amendments for which Statutory Instruments are designed, and represent a significant 
change to the principles underpinning part 3 of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act.  
Conclusions 
Parliament has never been given the opportunity to debate, and crucially vote, on the 
criminalisation of parents who take their children out of school for term-time holidays. Existing 
legislation clearly establishes a requirement that parents ensure their children attend school and 
creates a criminal liability for parents who fail to do so. The Anti-Social Behaviour Act made it easier 
for schools and local authorities to penalise parents who fail to meet this requirement. The creation 
of criminal liability and the application of penalty notices was, however, underpinned by a wide-
ranging discretion on the part of headteachers to decide when to authorise absences from school. 
Under the 2006 regulations parents did not have a right to take their children out of school for up to 
ten days holiday in any school year, but headteachers did have the discretion to authorise absences 
15 
 
on this basis. The change to the regulations in 2013 removed headteachers’ discretion in this area 
and created an automatic criminal liability for parents taking their children out of school to go on 
holiday. This in itself is somewhat anomalous given that in other areas headteachers retain 
significant discretion in relation to the authorisation of absence. Moreover, by changing the 
regulations in this way, the Education Secretary significantly changed the meaning of the Anti-Social 
Behaviour Act. The widespread use of penalty notices against parents who take their children out of 
school for holidays was not what Parliament intended when penalty notices were extended to 
encompass school absences in 2003 and the manner in which the regulations were changed in 2013 
provides a clear case for review.  
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